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Abstract: The aim of this article is to analyze the feasibility of a 
Domestic Resource Mobilization approach for the advancement of 
social movement causes in Latin America. Basically, the quest is 
focused on understanding whether Social Movement Organizations 
(SMO) operating in the region could mobilize the resources 
–funds and labor- of domestic elite instances in order to favor 
their beneficiary bases. This idea is contrasted with resource 
mobilization processes that privilege foreign political, financial 
and human transactions to advance social movement causes: 
basically, those inherent to the Foreign Aid Regime. Starting 
from an overview of the latter’s principles, its overall effect in 
developing countries and specific impact in the performance of 
Latin American SMOs, the article further organizes theoretical and 
factual elements that provide a moderately positive perspective 
regarding the feasibility of a Domestic Resource Mobilization 
approach by non-profit organizations in Latin America.
Resumen: El objetivo principal de este artículo es analizar la 
viabilidad de un enfoque que enfatice la movilización de recursos 
domésticos, para el avance de las causas de movimientos sociales 
en América Latina. La búsqueda se concentra en entender si 
las Organizaciones de Movimientos Sociales (OMS) que operan 
en la región pueden movilizar los recursos –dinero y trabajo, 
principalmente- de sectores élite domésticos, para favorecer a sus 
beneficiarios. Esta idea es contrastada con procesos de movilización 
de recursos que privilegian transacciones con instancias políticas y 
financieras foráneas: básicamente, aquellas que son características 
del Régimen de Ayuda Extranjera. El artículo comienza con una 
reseña de este último; sus principios y efectos en los países en 
desarrollo, asi como su impacto específico en la labor de las OMS 
en América Latina. Continúa con la presentación de categorías 
teóricas y datos que proveen una perspectiva moderadamente 
positiva con respecto a la viabilidad de un enfoque doméstico de 
movilización de recursos por parte de organizaciones sin ánimo 
de lucro en América Latina. 
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Introduction
The earliest academic impulse driving the author towards a then obscure concept 
of Domestic Resource Mobilization (DRM) was informed by a transformational 
perspective: recent literature advances the idea of mobilizing domestic 
political and economic instances, and the resources these posses, in order to 
conduct philanthropic initiatives in Latin American countries and diminish the 
dependence of social movements and Social Movement Organizations (SMO) in 
decreasing foreign resources. The acknowledgement of a trend incited a search 
for comprehensive approaches that could frame a still uncertain research topic 
on resource mobilization by social movements in Latin America. Nevertheless, a 
detailed examination of available literature found an evident dispersion of concerns 
and terminologies that drifted away from integral perspectives: philanthropy, 
corporate responsibility, lobbying, volunteering, intersectoral alliances etc; all 
elements belonging to a new perspective in Latin America’s non-profit practice 
but somehow loosely related to each other and missing a cohesive conceptual 
reference. How to account for novel domestic scenarios in resource mobilization 
and its effects in the outcomes of social movements?
This research starts off from the idea that a regularized interaction between 
SMOs, State institutions and economic elites is important for the advancement 
of social movement causes. The socially transformative capacities of National 
State and the funds and influence of wealthy sectors could and ought to play a 
major role in addressing the multifaceted social problematic endured by Latin 
America’s societies. The concept of Domestic Resource Mobilization (DRM) 
comprises this thought, as it encapsulates initiatives SMOs conduct in order to 
obtain larger commitments from domestic actors in public and private sectors 
vis-à-vis the civil and social rights causes of social movements. 
Historically, social movements in Latin America have not privileged institutional 
channels in order to advance their agendas. The preference of regular ‘political 
activity’(Reed, 1999) mechanisms -litigation, the ballot- or other forms of 
interlocution with political systems was undermined, before democratic transitions, 
by authoritarian and/or populist regimes, opposed or negligent to the civil and 
social rights causes of social movements. Although cooptation of movement’s 
causes by the State has been common –to placate major social unrest- persecution 
and marginalization marked the environment of organized social movement action. 
In the other hand, the virtual inexistence of non-religious philanthropy attested 
to the marginal status of social movements in the region. Charity allocations of 
funds and labor, carried on by Latin America’s wealthiest segments of society, 
were rarely destined to social movements which upheld perceived ‘subversive’ 
causes, such as labor or women’s rights. The Catholic Church and other religious 
organizations monopolized such contributions.
As a response to political and financial marginalization, social movements 
and their organized manifestations, the Social Movement Organizations, have 
resorted to two main expedients: first, public protest with a tendency to 
radicalization and violent organized action2; second, the appeal to foreign 
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financial and political instances to sustain their operations, make demands visible 
and gain domestic legitimacy. The mainstream financial and political domestic 
institutions of Latin America’s countries were, forcibly, circumvented by social 
movements in search of allies or partners to advance their causes. 
Nevertheless, the political and financial contexts in which SMOs operate have 
significantly changed in the last 20 years: transitions to democratic rule in Latin 
America, beginning in the late 70s and still consolidating, have opened new spaces 
for social participation within juristic or institutional frameworks, including the 
basic but nonetheless fundamental legalization of NGOs and SMOs in various of 
the region’s countries (Thompson, 2002). Several social organizations seemed 
to have taken advantage of this situation, consistently approaching the State 
to engage with it in different kinds of partnerships and other forms of dialogue, 
in order to carry out social development initiatives. Domestic philanthropy, in 
the other hand, is experiencing a noticeable surge, partially explained by the 
relative estrangement of social causes from ideological dogmas but also by the 
modernization of productive and industrial sectors in the region.
The conditions seem given for SMOs operating in Latin America to sought the 
alignment of the State and of domestic economic elites, within institutional 
means, to their causes: the fact that foreign aid allocations, both to States 
and Third Sector organizations, show a downward trend regarding Latin America 
adds to this assertion. Nonetheless, SMOs continue to heavily rely on foreign 
organizations and States and in the resources these provide. A frend towards 
combined intitutional and non-institutional action is also perceivable, at least 
in the case of prominent SMOs such as the Movement of Landless Workers 
(MTST) of Brazil, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities in Ecuador or 
the Piquetero Movement in Argentina (Contesse, 2004).
The article argues for a complementary approach to resource mobilization that 
also takes into account domestic resources in Latin America; foreign resources 
are still fundamental for the work of SMOs in the region and they cannot and 
will not be disregarded even if new horizons display for DRM. Nonetheless, it 
is pointed out that the possibility of mobilizing domestic resources open up 
spaces for autonomous action for SMOs and engages larger segments of national 
societies and States in social movement causes.
Foreign Aid Regime: motives, principles and domestic impact
Motives
It is relevant to evoke that the ethical-rhetorical principle of foreign aid is to 
assist and help those in need; to show concern, compassion and solidarity in 
all levels for whomever might require these due to long-standing or juncture 
grievances. Some authors even point out the fundamentally humanitarian 
motivation of foreign aid: 
 “[…] the essential causes (of foreign aid) lay in the humanitarian and 
egalitarian principles of the donor countries, and in their implicit belief that 
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only on the basis of a just international order in which all States had a chance 
to do well was peace and prosperity possible” (Lumsdaine, 1993:30) 
Nevertheless, an important academic sector underlines how the notions of 
aid, assistance, collaboration, humanitarianism, in international politics, all 
the same whilst seemingly emanating from merely altruistic manifestations of 
modern Western societies, are deeply embedded in concrete utilitarian impulses 
and strategic agendas. 
 ‘[...] is the pattern of aid flows dictated by political and strategic considerations 
which have little to do with rewarding good policies and helping the more efficient 
and less corrupt regimes in developing countries?’ (Alesina & Dollar, 2000:3).
Several studies have concluded that aid giving patterns are mainly dictated by 
political and strategic considerations. Whereas there might be a minority of 
donors responding to certain notions of “correctness” in international relations 
– such as the Nordic countries, The Netherlands and Canada, which compose a 
non-conforming aid sub-regime traditionally focused on civil rights promotion 
and poverty issues (Sogge, 2002: 40) – there is a substantially larger portion 
of aid initiatives and mechanisms that respond to political and geo strategic 
calculations. Aid as an instrument of foreign policy assists in widening geo 
political spheres of influence, undermining recipient’s political autonomy 
and consequently reducing its maneuvering space vis-à-vis foreign ideas and 
capital. Aid’s role in foreign policy and in deepening recipient’s dependency 
and vulnerability towards foreign financial assaults can be traced back to fairly 
well-known colonial or neo colonial doctrines:
The British Dual Mandate in Africa and Asia, which originated from Britain’s 
secular colonial rule in large areas of these continents, aiming at normalizing 
subordination under paternalistic assumptions: assisting or aiding the colonies 
for future self-reliance. A toned–down evolution of this concept can be perceived 
in the constitution of the British Commonwealth of Nations (Sogge, 2002).
The United State’s Good Neighbor policy during World War II, Alliance for Progress 
in the 60s and 70s and National Security doctrine in the late 70s and 80s, 
all focused in Latin America and all comprising an important percentage of 
technical and financial assistance, advancing USA’s geo-strategic domination of 
the Western Hemisphere and accounting little for recipient’s democratic record. 
Also, its pattern of aid giving in the Middle–East is and has been clearly driven 
by a geo-strategic mandate (Alesina and Dollar, 2000).
Frances’s mission civilisatrice indoctrinated its imperial exercise in the 19th 
century: ‘[colonial] administrators regarded themselves as children of the 
Enlightenment embarked upon a crusade to improve the lives of what they saw 
as the backward and oppressed peoples of Asia, Africa, and the Pacific’ (Groff, 
1999:488) In the post – colonial rule era, France directed its aid flows mainly 
to its previous overseas possessions, in order to maintain a vast sphere of 
influence granting it a voice in world’s geo politics.
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On the other hand, major multi lateral aid institutions advance the world’s 
strongest economies interests. The Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) 
implemented by the World Bank(WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
condition the issuing of new loans or the attainment of lower interest rates 
in existing loans to policy changes in recipient countries. These often include 
profound and far-reaching transformations which end up benefiting, directly or 
indirectly, developed countries’ productive sectors: cutting social expenditures 
or ‘austerity’ measures; trade liberalization, namely lifting import and export 
restrictions; opening of domestic stock markets; balancing budgets and not 
overspending; removing price controls and state subsidies; privatization, or 
divestiture of all or part of state-owned enterprises and enhancing the rights 
of foreign investors vis-à-vis national laws (Townson University, 1998). 
These measures empower foreign capital and financial systems as well as distort 
accountability in aid-recipient countries: besides the obvious economic benefits 
for the strongest economies –the main bilateral aid providers– as they expand 
markets and fuel their national productions there are significant political 
implications as the recipient, following the same upward line of obligations to 
multi lateral aid institutions, finds itself rendering accounts of governmental 
performance to single aid powers. It should be noticed that a number of bi 
lateral donor agencies, such as the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) also require reform measures along the lines of those prescribed in the 
SAPs and in a broader context those contained in the conceptual framework of 
the ‘Washington Consensus’ (Sogge, 2002:73).
The multi lateral banks, basically the most important players of the Aid industry 
-alongside with the United States- do not push draconian macroeconomic reforms 
in recipient countries in order to donate or award resources: the capital is lent 
and excruciatingly paid for. In 1999 ‘[…] lower income countries had paid to 
creditors almost five times more than what they received in aid grants’ (Sogge, 
2002:35). Reformist efforts so far have not proved themselves sufficient to 
hold these interests accountable or to truly empower recipient countries and 
societies in the aid regime. Besides all the catch phrases made for foreign aid, 
there might be a truthful claim for it: ‘Perhaps the safest generalization to 
make is that foreign aid, when used alone or in combination with other policy 
instruments, has a unique ability to allow the donor to demonstrate compassion 
while simultaneously pursuing a variety of other objectives’ (Arase, 1995:13).
Principles
Now, these agendas influence and are shaped too by power and domination 
discourses and are regulated by certain principles and implicit or explicit rules. 
Regarding the former, it has been already mentioned how Aid has sustained 
imperial and colonialist discourses making them appear as patronage or 
apprenticeship enterprises. Aid has been a key notion in the construction of a 
wider discourse of development that has legitimized domination: 
 ‘The construction of discourse under conditions of unequal power […] entails 
specific constructions of the colonial / Third World subject in/through discourses 
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in ways that allows the exercise of power over it’ (Escobar, 1995:9) ‘[…] the 
development discourse is governed by the same principles (of the colonial 
discourse): it has created an extremely efficient apparatus for producing 
knowledge about, and the exercise of power over, the Third World’ (Ibid:9). 
In the specific context of the aid regime, many cases of recipient initiatives set 
up to afford some control over aid have been consistently blocked: the creation 
of the UN Fund for Economic Development was proposed by some recipient 
countries in the late fifties, with the idea of setting up a soft–loan bank for 
developing countries. The proposal was met with the opposition of the World 
Bank, which succeeded in its sabotage; later, the latter mainstreamed the 
idea with the setting up of its own soft – loan mechanism, the International 
Development Association (IDA) for the world’s poorest countries. Other 
Southern ideas such as the Lagos Plan of Action, the Final Act of Lagos, the 
African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programs and the 
proposal to create the Asian Monetary Fund have been bluntly opposed to by 
the aid establishment (Sogge, 2002: 68). 
Negotiation: there is none or minimum. The donor has almost total precedence 
over aid’s provision. 
Aid in relation to other flows: the donors use aid to promote or deter trade 
flows and investment capital. 
Relations among official donors: they should not compete or promote rival 
economic paradigms. 
Relations between official donors and civil society: interaction is limited 
to organizations sharing donor’s ideas and methods. 
Conditionality: the recipient countries should plead commitment to donor’s policy 
instructions and demonstrate reform results in order to be considered for aid.
Aid and Debt: recipient countries should meet debt repayments for continued 
aid eligibility.
(Sogge, 2002:60-61)
Box 1:
Six specific principles governing the foreign aid regime 
Domestic Impact
Foreign aid’s impact at the domestic level is multifaceted and far-reaching; 
besides the potential positive impact of successful projects supported by foreign 
funds and expertise, there is a vast array of consequences oppositely at work 
regarding one of aid’s rhetorical purposes since its patronage époques: to foster 
Clío América • Universidad del Magdalena • Clío América • Universidad del Magdalena • Clío América • Universidad del
201
Magdalena • Clío América • Universidad del Magdalena • Clío América • Universidad del del Magdalena • Clío América 
recipient’s self-reliance and capacities to carry on without donor intervention. 
There are many reasons for this, among them aid’s role in advancing donor's power 
agendas and the concurrent action of subordinated Southern elites. Nonetheless, 
it has not been mentioned how the aid regime itself is fundamentally grounded 
in an expansionist dynamic that disregard interruption or phase–out: both donor 
and recipient aid establishments have to ‘Move the Money’ to sustain bureaucratic 
livelihoods, power enclaves and basically a whole public service industry based 
upon a continuing and increased flow of foreign resources (Sogge, 2002:89-90). 
Aid’s success then appears to be irrelevant, as well as its failure. What truly 
matters is the ability to keep the funds flowing, even if that requires made-
up project results, a privilege for action, spending and short–term outcomes 
instead of focus on learning and long term planning. Reflection and criticism 
are marginalized, as well as recipient’s initiatives to diminish aid-independency, 
because these are threats to the regime’s existence.
 ‘Countries that were self–sufficient in food crops at the end of World War II 
–many of them even exported food to industrialized nations- became net 
food importers throughout the development era. Hunger similarly grew as 
the capacity of countries to produce the food necessary to feed themselves 
contracted under the pressure to produce cash crops (and) accept cheap 
food from the West […]’ (Escobar, 1995:104). 
Aid, as part of a larger development discourse and practice, seriously undermines 
the coping mechanisms set in place by its targeted societies. In an economic 
dimension, aid basically produces a ‘drain of public revenues, as priority goes to 
debt repayment and the running costs of aid-financed investments (and a) reduced 
tax effort and reduced revenue self–reliance’ (Sogge, 2002:100) In a political 
dimension, aid debilitates an accountable interaction among citizens, civil society 
organizations and national governments in various areas of public policy formulation 
and implementation -such as poverty eradication (Hermele, 2005). Aid-dependency 
weakens and de legitimizes the pursuit of serious tax policies by governments or 
Domestic Resource Mobilization strategies by NGOs. Resource mobilization is left 
to invisible, closed and unaccountable decision–making schemes when foreign aid 
is in command or has a powerful say. Government’s responsibilities begin to reside 
upwards in the aid chain and it begins to lose negotiation muscle regarding trade, 
investment and many other sovereign interests.
Foreign Aid and SMOs in Latin America
In the specific case of Latin America, the principle of conditionality appears 
to be decisive to explain, not only the aid allocation schemes that are in place 
among recipient States and foreign donor institutions, but also those which 
SMOs privilege and are involved in. The relationship between foreign donors 
and the SMOs or NGOs in the period before democratic transitions and worldwide 
market liberalization had very different contours compared to the current one: 
the main multilateral donors (The World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund) focused their resources on State-driven aid and structural State reform 
and minimized emphasis on poverty reduction issues, a trend that has been 
202
Clío América • Universidad del Magdalena • Clío América • Universidad del Magdalena • Clío América • Universidad delMagdalena • Clío América • Universidad del Magdalena • Clío América • Universidad del del Magdalena • Clío América 
recently changing3. This limited the access of SMOs working on rights-oriented 
issues to multilateral resources (Villaboas et al., 2004). Consequently, private 
aid transfers, mainly from Northern to Latin American SMOs (including within 
the latter concept Northern SMOs working in the region) dominated the non-
profit resource mobilization scene (Villaboas et al., 2004). The conditions 
attached to private North-Latin America aid allocations, in the SMO context, 
were not as stringent as the ones imposed by multilateral or bilateral donors 
on States and Governments: SMOs had a relatively broad maneuvering room 
to access foreign resources based on own problem assessments and agenda 
definitions (Villaboas et al., 2004)). The situation has substantially changed. 
SMOs operating in Latin America mobilize resources from a varied array of foreign 
institutions and organizations and, increasingly, from domestic instances. SMOs 
are subject to Northern conditionality, imposed by now accessible multilateral 
institutions4 or by Northern SMOs. Three main transformations have modified 
the scenario: worldwide market reforms, decreasing or re allocated aid resources 
and democratic transitions. The first issue is basically referred to the expansion 
of free market and business logics into non-profit terrain and its effect on 
North – South SMO cooperation: 
 ‘[Northern SMOs] institutional imperatives of growth, size, and market 
share tend to outweigh the developmental imperatives of partnership and 
cooperation, especially in winning contracts for the provision of humanitarian 
assistance, which are central to the continued survival of most international 
NGOs in their current form. These contracts pay for the infrastructure of the 
organization as a whole, but reduce the amount of room for maneuver in 
the agency’s strategic choices. NGOs tend to import the philosophy of the 
market uncritically, treating development as a commodity, measuring market 
share as success, and equating being professional in their work with being 
businesslike […]’ (Edwards, 1999:29).
Northern SMOs have had to subject to the toughened rules and conditions of 
national aid agencies –their foremost donors- in an environment of marketplace 
competition and stagnant private donations (Edwards, 1999:30). The 
retrenchment of the State due to market reforms might partially explain shrinking 
national aid budgets. This has driven SMOs to look for different instances from 
where to mobilize resources, namely multilateral aid institutions, with the 
consequent acceptance of their conditions.5 These new terms are translated 
to Southern and Latin American NGOs which, in order to access the resources 
have to comply with a large set of third–hand foreign-imposed terms. On the 
other hand, market reforms might have also triggered a general trend towards 
non-concessionary forms of international cooperation. The status and position 
of aid in international relations is being speedily replaced by free-trade and 
investment agreements (Edwards, 1999a) a trend that also explains a ‘widespread 
decline in official aid budgets’6 (Edwards, 1999:26). The concentration of 
concessionary or subsidized resources to priority regions –namely Africa and 
some Asian countries- by bi lateral and multilateral donors has also affected 
Latin American States and SMOs (Vos et al., 2007) Nonetheless the latter seem 
to benefit from another kind of aid reallocations: 
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 ‘Increasingly, however, aid is flowing directly to NGOs in Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America rather than passing through traditional northern NGO intermediaries 
[this trend] has been accelerated by the desire of bilateral and multilateral 
aid agencies to decentralize their operations, and by increasing question 
marks about the value added by northern NGOs in the transfer of funds […] 
Because the use of northern intermediaries raises the transactions costs of 
aid delivery, why pay their overheads when the money could be channeled 
more cost-effectively directly to the South?’ (Edwards, 1999:27).
The preference of donor agencies for direct funding of Southern SMOs –avoiding 
Northern intermediation- is informed by a growing trust on the latter’s built 
capacity and leading expertise (Edwards, 1999:27). In Latin America, the 
escalation of organized social movement action (Kaimowitz, 1992) and the 
availability for non-profits of professional resources (qualified labor, for 
instance) with the advent of democracy could explain this shift. Now, this 
appears as a positive development but it could actually diminish the financial 
and programmatic autonomy of Latin American SMOs. Beyond the traditional 
resource intermediation Northern SMOs provided -filled up with conditions and 
preeminent foreign agendas- direct access to multilateral and bilateral donor’s 
resources favors the collusion of Latin American SMOs with foreign aid regime’s 
motives, principles and larger conditionality schemes.
‘When foreign aid conditions were discussed in the 1970s, they usually referred 
mainly to adjustment programs from multilateral financial organizations, or related 
to donor governments imposing aid, with commercial and political strings attached, 
on Southern governments. More recently however, this policy of conditions has 
also become a frequent practice in official and private international cooperation 
processes involving Southern NGO, despite the proclaimed right to ‘ownership’ 
that official donors attribute to the South, and the discourse on South-North 
partnership insisted upon by Northern NGOs and foundations’ (Valderrama, 2001:3) 
Latin American SMOs do not avoid this new trend: a recent research carried out 
among SMOs in the region (Villaboas et al., 2004) showed how conditionality has 
imposed itself over partnership and cooperation: 
‘[…] the results of this study were that conditionality is mostly imposed in 
three areas: 
a. Agendas and priority issues; 
b. Location focus; 
c. Programming, monitoring and evaluation and accountability systems [...]’ 
(Reality of Aid Report, 2004:3).
Regarding the first issues, the consulted sources –SMOs in Brazil, Nicaragua, 
Guatemala and Perú- argued that foreign-designed agendas were often imposed, 
without further discussion, by international donors. Priorities within these agendas 
are also set from the outside, being certain themes –such as gender equality or 
environmental protection- first on the list (Villaboas et al., 2004:4) Moreover, 
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the parameters to be followed in order to address these agendas are also largely 
responding to foreign terms of engagement (Valderrama, 2001:7). The issue of 
location or geo-political emphasis of operations falls within the same sphere of 
pre-set priorities. Also, conditions are added to the thematic impositions. They 
regard to project planning, monitoring and evaluation: 
 ‘[…] one of the areas in which northern NGOs impose conditionality more 
forcefully is in requirements of a formal nature: forms; planning; monitoring 
and evaluation - PME - systems; accountability; indicators; etc. In Guatemala, 
the Programming Monitoring-Evaluation system induced from the North 
has proven to contribute positively to sorting out project management. 
The problem is that it has been imposed as a universal model and the only 
planning tool. The logical frame does not adequately contemplate what the 
project means to the community. There is the added inconvenience that the 
planning system offers little flexibility in adapting it to specific contexts, 
which often change.’ (Villaboas et al., 2004:8).
The new emphasis on administration, quantifiable results, short-termed project-
oriented funding and ‘[…] the disappearance of the concept of programs and 
the return of that of contracts […]’ (Villaboas et al, 2004:8) has not only 
resulted in weakening the independence of Latin American and Southern 
SMOs in general; it has affected an adequate regard of their local expertise 
and reality assessment. Now, what is perhaps ultimately significant is that 
this trend deviates time, resources and focus from those which cooperation is 
supposed to assist- the poor and excluded. The accountability processes run, 
once more, upward to invisible instances strange to local realities. ‘[…] unlike 
in the past when there were attempts to establish a dialog on agendas and 
forms of cooperation, decisions are now increasingly made in the North with 
the message to “take it or leave it”, implying a philosophy of “those who pay 
call the shots.” […]’ (Valderrama, 2001:3).
Perspectives for a DRM approach in Latin America
Resource mobilization, in the context of this article, is defined as the series of 
strategies and initiatives carried out by Social Movement Organizations in order 
to channel resources for the advancement of its causes (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). 
The concept of cause refers to the demands and/or needs the organizations aims 
to articulate and/or satisfy, and the constituency from where these arise7. The 
concept of resources is equaled to funds and labor drawn from third parties to 
the SMOs or to the causes the SMOs are advancing (McCarthy & Zald, 1977).
The concept of Domestic Resource Mobilization (DRM) refers to resource mobilization 
processes carried out within delimited national, regional, provincial, municipal 
and community levels. It differs from mere resource mobilization as it focuses 
its span to resources made available at any intra-societal dimension in modern 
Nation-States. For this article, the domestic specificity of resource mobilization 
is relevant as it marks contrasts with resource mobilization processes inherent to 
the foreign aid regime, in terms of autonomy for Latin American SMOs.
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In Latin America, SMOs have traditionally resorted to foreign resources, provided 
by international SMOs, NGOs, multilateral organizations, foreign States and 
individuals (Villaboas et al., 2004). Historically, domestic political and economic 
instances have been bypassed. Why? SMOs have been historically marginalized 
and persecuted in the region by authoritarian regimes (Landim & Thompson, 
1997). The appeal to mainstream political and economic resources by SMOs 
was thus heavily constrained. Public authorities and economic elites in non-
democratic regimes were negligent or antagonistic of social movement causes, 
if these were compromised with social and political change. This complicated 
or simply impeded mobilizing the resources that these instances control and 
that could be channeled by the SMOs, a fact that partially explained a heavy 
reliance of Latin American SMOs in foreign aid (Grugel, 2000; Aldaba et al 2000) 
A relatively recent transition to democracy in the region improves the chances 
to mobilize enclave establishment resources.
A group of theories on social movements define two minimums for social movements 
and SMOs to carry out resource mobilization: State’s tolerance or favorability to the 
social movement cause and the existence of discretionary resources in society. Also, 
the Resource Mobilization theories prescribe the active quest for such favorability 
and discretionary resources, as the soundest strategy to advance a social movement 
cause. Thus an elitist approach to social activism is privileged. Popular protest 
and massive demonstrations -and other types of mobilizations aiming to generate 
changes in status quos- might not render concrete results if they are not endorsed 
by a ‘normalized’ interaction between vanguard social organizations and political 
and economic establishments (Jenkins 1983; Kitschelt 1986). 
 
In Latin America, an approach to resource mobilization that usufructs the 
national economic, political and public opinion environments in which the 
SMOs are embedded, could avoid or at least diminish the preeminence of 
foreign conditions and agendas. It could also attribute broader autonomy to 
SMOs and engage traditionally negligent (and influential) domestic actors in 
social movement causes. A common sense idea, apparently: but if the exercise 
of political power and the social and civil rights situation in Latin America are 
taken into account, it might claim a relative novelty. 
Authoritarianism, often materialized in military rule, swept through Latin 
America since the 1960s. This generated a transition from a populist, corporatist 
style to a period of brutal repression of societal organizations working for civil, 
social and political rights. (Landim & Thompson, 1997:345). During this period 
human rights were violated in a systematic manner. Towards the end of the 
1970s, an important group of Latin American countries were still governed by 
authoritarian regimes. Exceptions could be found in the Andean region, where 
Colombia stands out for its formal democratic stability in spite of a long-lasting 
armed conflict; Venezuela, which witnessed the withdrawal of the military from 
government since the end of the 1950s and Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador which 
made the transition from military rule in the early to mid 1970s. Nevertheless, 
the Southern cone of the continent experienced the transitions between the end 
of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s and Central American countries 
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gave way to the resolution of their high-intensity internal conflicts during the 
early 1990s (UNDP, 2005: 78-79). 
The SMOs working for human rights in Latin America were –and still are to 
a lesser degree in certain countries- consistently sabotaged, marginalized, 
persecuted or plainly illegalized by authoritarian rulers. Mobilization of 
domestic political, economic and public opinion instances for a social movement 
cause was bluntly out of the question, when powerful sectors fundamentally 
antagonized the SMOs and their agendas (and perhaps any alterations to the 
status-quo). The transition to democracy and radical economic liberalization 
in Latin America since the 1980s are factors that have drastically widened 
the range of action for SMOs and, effectively, the so-called Third Sector is 
blooming in the region (Sorj and De Oliveira, 2007). 
The electoral aspects of a democratic political system have been sufficiently 
observed by Latin American countries during the period 1990-2002 fulfilling 
the minimum, operational–level requisites of democracy (UNDP, 2005): elected 
public authorities; universal suffrage; free and fair elections; the right to 
contest for public office; freedom of expression; access to pluralist information; 
freedom of association; respect for mandates; a territory that clearly defines the 
voting demos (Dahl, 1971). With all the limitations these categories present 
in practice, they represent a major advance for the region and constitute an 
adequate institutional environment for further reform (Sen, 1999) Electoral 
citizenship shows acceptable levels in Latin America. The problems arise when 
the region’s accomplishments in the field of civil and social citizenships are 
analyzed. Indicators present a very negative picture in that regard especially 
concerning the set of rights constituting the latter (UNDP, 2005). ‘For the first 
time in history, an entire developing region with profoundly unequal societies 
is, in its entirety, organized politically under democratic governments. Thus a 
new and unprecedented situation has emerged in Latin America: the coexistence 
of democracy, poverty and inequality’ (UNDP, 2005:39). The concurrence of 
democracy, poverty and inequality is frequent in other regions but unique in this 
context if it is taken into account that Latin America has a high level of poverty 
and the highest level of inequality in the world (UNDP, 2005). A contradictory 
picture of Latin America emerges then, where democratic electoral rights and 
mechanisms are enforced and functioning at acceptable levels but civil and 
social rights are largely unattended by the State. 
The SMOs are now legalized and to larger extents legitimized in public opinion. 
State’s shrinking welfare role has multiplied their opportunities as basic 
services providers. Public institutions and officials are now subject to electoral 
processes, constitutional mandates and increasing accountability mechanisms. 
Therefore the mobilization potential of State’s resources for the SMOs’ social 
agendas is concrete. Also, economic elites and productive sectors are faced 
with public debate around their ‘social responsibility’ role. This trend makes 
wealthy segments of population prone to assign resources for philanthropic 
initiatives. If a scenario of reduced or heavily conditioned foreign aid flows is 
also considered, it is arguably that the current is an appropriate conjuncture for 
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a DRM approach. Now, the political environment for advancing social movement 
causes at a domestic level is certainly improving but, could SMOs sustain their 
operations with domestic resources? Are not Latin America’s financially poor 
countries? The categorization made by the World Bank based on per-capita 
income indicators might illustrate the point.
The stratification of countries based in per-capita annual income was first 
established by the World Bank (WB) to classify world economies based on their 
lending capabilities. In the latest update, these categories were constituted as 
follows: low income, US$905 or less; lower middle income, US$906 - US$3,595; 
upper middle income, US$3,596 - US$11,115; and high income, US$11,116 or more 
(WB, 2008). These categories -not the ciphers or figures- do not respond to cross-
sector and cross-country data analysis regarding international purchasing standards 
of primary goods and services, although at least there is a broad consensus in 
the revised literature as to which are the levels of income attached to worldwide 
poverty and extreme poverty (DFID, 2004; ODI, 2004; WB 2008a). Basically, income 
and countries are categorized by the World Bank as both are contrasted with 
internal criteria regarding debt-repayment capabilities or creditworthiness (IDA, 
2008) of potential loan recipients. Thus an annual per–capita national income of 
US$905, example given, does not qualifies a country as low-income because its 
inhabitants cannot access to certain basic goods and services – which might as 
well be the case- but as it does not matches minimum debt-repayment safeguards 
in order for the World Bank to authorize issuing or reissuing loans. 
The starting number for loan eligibility is US$1065 per-capita income in 2006 
(WB, 2008): within less than that figure fall all economies eligible for IDA 
(International Development Association, a dependence of the World Bank) 
lending, which is characterized for its mainly concessional and interest-free terms 
(WB, 2008). Starting at that figure and plus, all the countries with sufficient 
resources to duly respond to creditors are included. Middle income countries 
are within this ‘eligible’ lending category for the main multilateral bank and 
foremost actor of the aid regime, the World Bank. This might not by itself be 
sufficient to characterize these countries’ wealth but at least indicates that 
resources exist there sufficiently as to be compromised for mediate financial 
transactions that, eventually, might double its original figure (Sogge, 2002). 
All Latin American countries fall within the categorizations of lower or upper 
middle-income countries, according to the World Bank (WB, 2008). Also, reports 
point out to a significant increase of (concentrated) wealth in the region for 
2007 – a 23.2% rise in individuals holding more than 1 million in financial 
assets (World Wealth Report, 2007). 
Consequently, evidence suggests that Latin American countries are neither 
structurally poor nor devoid of capital resources but characterized by an extremely 
unequal income distribution. Interpreting and acting upon the new political and 
financial scenarios, several SMOs have succeeded in mobilizing their constituencies, 
large sectors of public opinion and the media and in accomplishing certain social 
and civil rights gains. The most notorious being the indigenous movements in 
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the Andean countries which, trough large public manifestations, have managed 
to deeply influence electoral outcomes and have played a crucial role in recent 
institutional crises (Sorj and De Oliveira, 2007).
Conclusions
The principles and motives of the foreign aid regime, as well as its impacts in 
developing countries, have been analyzed in the first part of this article. Based 
on the reviewed literature, a general conclusion was reached for each one of the 
aforementioned aspects: first, the motives of aid are occasionally humanitarian and 
consistently strategic; second, its principles enthrone donors’ agendas and relegate 
the perspective of aid-recipients; and third, it might obstruct autonomous responses 
to domestic issues in developing countries, generating cycles of dependency, for 
instance, in the form of debt repayment or foreign grant-seeking. On the other hand, 
different authors and organizations endorse the regime, its necessity and altruistic 
dynamic (Lumsdaine 1990) as well as underline its results. 
Regardless of all the evidence against or in favor of foreign aid, a single idea is 
shared, at least rhetorically, by most of its actors and commentators: be it in 
its most sporadic forms -relief for natural or humanitarian calamities; assistance 
for post-war reconstruction- or in its institutionalized manifestations -Overseas 
Development Assistance from industrialized to developing countries and World 
Bank’s lending, for instance- foreign aid is meant to constitute a transitory 
regime. It represents an extraordinary intervention of foreign actors in national 
agendas. In an ideal world-scenario, foreign aid would be a finite phenomenon: 
every country and society should be able to subsist and develop its potentials 
autonomously; to address its problems and attend its people’s demands in an 
independent manner. The initiatives aimed at encountering non-assisted paths 
to ‘development’ or at least at diminishing aid’s prevalence, mostly at the 
recipient end of aid, are thus relevant and significant. 
Strictly following the conceptual premises of the Resource Mobilization theories, the 
minimum conditions exist in Latin America for the implementation of a DRM approach 
by social movements: first, the existence of discretionary or elite resources, possessed 
by wealthy segments of population that concentrate the highest proportion of gross 
national incomes; and second, the incumbency of political regimes that in the least 
positive scenario, would tolerate social movement activism; this is, the democratic 
systems that are consolidating in Latin America.
 
It can be stated that an approach that usufructs the national economic, political 
and public opinion environments in which the SMOs are embedded, for the 
achievement of its social and civil rights goals is at least possible. The transition to 
democracy and radical economic liberalization in Latin America since the 1980s are 
factors that have drastically widened the range of action for SMOs and, effectively, 
the so-called Third Sector is blooming in the region (Sorj and De Oliveira., 2007). 
The SMOs are now legalized and to larger extents legitimized in public opinion. 
State’s shrinking welfare role has multiplied their opportunities as basic services 
providers. Public institutions and officials are now subject to electoral processes, 
constitutional mandates and strengthened accountability mechanisms. 
Clío América • Universidad del Magdalena • Clío América • Universidad del Magdalena • Clío América • Universidad del
209
Magdalena • Clío América • Universidad del Magdalena • Clío América • Universidad del del Magdalena • Clío América 
Therefore the mobilization potential of institutional resources for the SMOs’ 
social agendas is concrete. Economic elites and the productive sector are faced 
also with public debate around their ‘social responsibility’ role in these highly 
unequal contexts. This trend makes wealthy segments of population prone to 
assign resources for philanthropic initiatives. If a scenario of reduced or heavily 
conditioned foreign aid flows is also considered, it is arguably that the current 
is an appropriate conjuncture for Domestic Resource Mobilization.
Notas y Citas
(1)  SMOs are organizations belonging to a specific social movement and sharing its basic 
concerns and causes (McCarthy & Zald 1977). The social movement and the cause of civil 
rights are, for instance, constituted by different SMOs that work to advance the cause.
(2)  For instance, the transformation of peasant and indigenous movements in Colombia into 
Guerrilla organizations; the radicalization of opposition groups in the southern cone of 
South America and their transformation into urban militias (Wickham-Crowley 1994).
(3)  Bonsdorff & Voipio (2005).
(4)  Bonsdorff & Voipio (2005) and Hermele (2004) analyze the recent shift of World Bank’s programs 
towards poverty reduction and civil society participation.
(5)  ‘[Northern SMOs] frequently adopted the viewpoint of the World Bank and other official 
agencies. As a result, they took on projects of a more social-assistance nature, or 
spearheaded massive humanitarian aid programs in situations of social emergency, in order 
to obtain funding. In that sense, an instrumental rationale has been consolidating itself 
in the North regarding the fight against poverty[…] (Reality Of Aid Report, 2004).
(6)  Evidence pointing out to decreasing foreign aid global flows is also found in: (Edwards et 
al., 1999b); (World Bank, 1998); (Aldaba et al, 2000); (Smillie and Helmich, 1993).
(7)  As an example: Plan International, an international NGO focused on promoting children’s 
welfare worldwide would be denominated, in the context of this article, as an organization 
belonging to the social movement that protects the rights of children. The cause that it 
aims to advance is that of children rights and its constituency the world’s infants.
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